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The year 2011 was the 14th since the first commercial release of a genetically modified (GM) crop in South Africa. In 1997/98, insect-resistant (Bt) cotton was released for production, and South Africa 
became the first country in Africa where a GM crop was produced on a com-
mercial level. Bt maize was approved for commercial production in 1998/99, 
and Bt yellow maize was planted in the same season. The first plantings of 
Bt white maize in 2001/02 established South Africa as the first GM subsis-
tence crop producer in the world. Herbicide-tolerant (HT) cotton was made 
available for commercial production in the 2001/02 season along with HT 
soybeans. Commercialization of HT maize seeds followed in 2003/04. GM 
cotton containing the combined or “stacked” trait (Bt and HT) was released 
for the 2005/06 season, and Bt/HT maize was released for the 2007/08 pro-
duction season. 
This chapter supplies a brief summary of the performance, socioeconomic 
impacts, and main issues surrounding Bt cotton and GM maize in South 
Africa. A substantial number of peer reviewed papers on GM crops in South 
Africa have been published, and it is recommended that interested readers 
refer to these publications for more in-depth information and discussion on 
the studies and findings. 
South African Biosafety Framework
In 1989 a US seed company approached the South African Department of 
Agriculture for permission to perform contained field trials with Bt cotton. 
This set in motion the South African biosafety regulatory process and ini-
tiated the first trials with GM crops on the African continent. The South 
African Committee for Genetic Experimentation (SAGENE) had been formed 
in 1979 by public and private scientists to monitor and advise the National 
Department of Agriculture and industry on the responsible development of 
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genetically modified organisms (GMOs) through the provision of guidelines 
and the approval of research centers and projects. SAGENE gained statutory sta-
tus in 1992 as the national advisory committee on modern GM biotechnology. 
The approval for the commercial release of Bt cotton and maize was done under 
the guidelines of SAGENE for the 1997/98 and 1998/99 seasons. These guide-
lines and procedures remained the biosafety framework cornerstone until South 
Africa’s GMO Act 15 of 1997 was approved by Parliament in June 1997 and 
entered into force in November 1999, when the regulations were published. In 
1999 SAGENE was replaced by the scientific Advisory Committee that was 
established under the GMO Act (Wolson and Gouse 2005). The South African 
GMO Act 15/1997, as amended in 2006, provides a comprehensive biosafety 
framework to manage research, development, application, production, and trade 
in GMOs. The GMO Secretariat is housed in the Department of Agriculture, 
and decisionmaking is vested in the GMO Executive Council that represents 
eight government departments. The Council is advised by a national Advisory 
Committee of scientific experts. 
Since implementation, the GMO legislation has served the country well in 
its balanced approach to modern biotechnology and its applications. However, 
more recently there have been some unclear delays in the decisionmaking pro-
cess, and the scientific community and academia have expressed concern that 
decisionmaking has become less scientific and a lack of transparency in the 
process could lead to an increase in the cost of regulation and in the opportu-
nity cost for research institutions, innovators, and in reality, consumers.
Bt Cotton
In 2007 GM cotton globally covered 15 million hectares (43 percent of total 
world cotton), of which Bt varieties accounted for 10.8 million hectares 
and a further 3.2 million hectares as Bt combined with a second Bt or with 
an herbicide-tolerance trait ( James 2007). In 2009 the global GM cotton area 
increased to 16.2 million hectares and in 2011 to 25 million or 68 percent 
of global cotton plantings ( James 2009, 2011). Historically, cotton has been 
responsible for about 25 percent of global chemical insecticides used in agri-
culture due to attacks by a range of insect pests (Woodburn 1995), with cot-
ton bollworm being the main pest. In an effort to reduce insecticide use and 
with insect resistance build-up against chemicals, Bt technology has offered 
a cost-saving and environmentally friendlier alternative. 
Cotton planting in South Africa declined from its peak of 180,000 hect-
ares in 1988 (under tariff protection) to just over 5,000 hectares in 2010 due 
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to a combination of market liberalization, low world cotton prices, and rela-
tively better prices for competing crops like maize, sunflower seed, and sugar 
cane. South Africa has been a net importer of cotton for the past couple of 
decades. In 1997/98 South Africa became the first country in Africa to com-
mercially produce GM crops with the release of Bt cotton. The initial uptake 
of the first Bt cotton varieties of the US cotton seed company, Delta and 
Pineland (D&PL), was less than spectacular, as the conventional varieties of 
local ginning companies were more popular. Some commercial farmers were 
also cautious during the first seasons and wanted to test the new technology 
and see how ginners and the rest of the industry reacted. However, when the 
Bt gene was introduced into D&PL’s popular OPAL variety (originally from 
Australia), adoption increased dramatically. NuOPAL (Bt), DeltaOPAL RR 
(HT), and NuOPAL RR (Stacked Bt/HT), which are currently planted in 
South Africa, are all based on the Delta OPAL germplasm (Gouse 2009).
As clearly shown in Table 1.1, Bt cotton has been very popular, reaching 
70 percent of total cotton area in 2003. The share decreased somewhat 
with the introduction of HT cotton, but Bt cotton remained the more 
popular of the two. With the introduction of stacked cotton (with both 
the Bt and HT events), Bt’s share dropped considerably as farmers opted 
for cotton with both traits. By the 2005/06 season 92 percent of the cotton 
plantings in South Africa were GM. A large share of the conventional cotton 
being planted is mandatory refugia that are planted alongside Bt fields to 
prevent insect-resistance development. Farmers tend to plant HT cotton as 
refugia for stacked Bt/HT plantings.
Despite various land reform and development projects attempting to set-
tle small-scale farmers in established and potential cotton production areas, 
the traditional areas of Tonga (in Kangwane Mpumalanga) and Makhathini 
Flats (KwaZulu-Natal) remain the major contributors to smallholder cotton 
production. The total number of smallholder cotton producers has varied but 
generally amounts to a few thousand farmers with the vast majority of them 
situated on the Makhathini Flats. As large-scale farmers produce the bulk of 
the South African cotton crop, it would not be totally correct to suggest that 
the adoption figures in Table 1.1 apply to smallholders as well, though Bt cot-
ton adoption by smallholders has not been less impressive. In the first com-
mercialization season of 1997, only 4 farmers planted demonstration Bt plots 
under the guidance of Monsanto (the technology owner). In 1998, 75 farm-
ers, or 3.4 percent of the cotton farmers on Makhathini, planted Bt cotton; in 
1999, 411 farmers, or 13.7 percent, planted Bt. In 2000, 1,184 cotton farm-
ers (39.5 percent) on the Makhathini Flats planted Bt cotton. In 2001 it was 
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estimated that close to 3,000 of the 3,229 farmers on the Flats planted Bt, 
reaching close to 90 percent adoption in five years (Gouse 2009).
This remarkable adoption rate was explained partly by the impressive 
performance of Bt cotton as planted by the first adopting Makhathini farm-
ers. However, the other major explanation was that the sole credit and input 
supplier and cotton buyer on the Flats, Vunisa, also noticed the performance 
of Bt cotton and started to recommend the seed to its clients/farmers. As the 
main objective of a cotton gin is to gin as much cotton as possible, Vunisa 
wanted to increase the cotton crop on the Flats but not at the expense of 
their credit book. After monitoring the performance of Bt cotton for the 
first couple of seasons, Vunisa decided that it could increase the ginable cot-
ton crop, and decrease the risk of crop failure (due to bollworm damage) 
and thus their credit risk by recommending Bt cotton to farmers. It can 
be argued that even though Vunisa was making inputs available to farm-
ers under credit long before Bt was introduced, the availability of credit and 
the role Vunisa’s extension officers had in recommending Bt seed played a 
large role in smallholders’ ability and decision to adopt the new technology 
(Gouse 2009).
All the peer reviewed publications on Bt cotton in South Africa (mainly 
focusing on smallholder farmers) report yield increases with the use of Bt 
cotton compared to conventional varieties (Table 1.2). Almost all studies 
also showed savings in insecticide expenditure; with the exception of results 
from the one-year, 20-farmer study by Hofs, Fok, and Vaissayre (2006). Even 
though most of the yield differences were substantial, some were found not 
to be statistically significant, mainly due to small sample sizes and large vari-
ability in the data. Compared to study results in countries like Australia, 
China, India, and Mexico, the relative yield gain from the use of Bt cotton in 
South Africa is higher. One of the reasons for this is that the base yield (non-
Bt cotton) of smallholders is very low, and a small change in yield is exag-
gerated when expressed relative to a low conventional variety yield. In fact, 
in some other countries, the yield advantage of Bt cotton was more than the 
total seed cotton yield attained per hectare in South Africa (Fok et al. 2007). 
Gouse, Kirsten, and Jenkins (2003) found an 18.5 percent yield increase 
for South African large-scale irrigation farmers for the 2000/2001 sea-
son, which compares well with a 16.8 percent increase measured on field 
trials at a Clark Cotton (a ginning company) experimental farm in Mpuma-
langa. Large-scale dryland farmers enjoyed a 14 percent yield increase, while 
some studies found that small-scale dryland farmers enjoyed an increase of 
between 23 and 85 percent over a number of seasons (Table 1.2). 
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These trends are consistent with findings elsewhere, such as in Argentina 
(Qaim, Cap, and De Janvry 2003), where large-scale commercial farmers were 
reported to enjoy 19 percent yield increases and smallholder farmers reported 
41 percent yield increases. Like Qaim, Cap, and De Janvry (2003), South African 
researchers attribute the difference between the Bt yield advantages of small- 
and large-scale farmers to the financial and human capital constraints that cause 
smallholders to invest in chemical pest control. Shankar and Thirtle (2005) 
showed that the average insecticide application level of smallholder farmers on 
the Makhathini Flats is lower than 50 percent of the optimal level; it is thus not 
surprising that Bt cotton is able to substantially reduce the yield loss caused by 
bollworms. With low control-group yields and limited (and in many cases in-
effective) chemical insecticide applications, exaggerated yield increases in excess 
of 50, 60, and 80 percent as reported by Bennett, Morse, and Ismael (2006) do 
not seem so mind-boggling. But these results have to be seen in context, and as 
the authors caution, the figures might also be inflated due to selection bias. 
The yield increase with Bt cotton, compared to conventional cotton, 
depends on the bollworm infestation level in the particular season and the 
effectiveness of chemical bollworm control by the farmer. It can be expected 
that the yield advantage will differ across farmers, farms, regions, and seasons 
(Fok et al. 2007). Both large-scale and smallholder farmers enjoyed significant 
savings on insecticides (generally 3/4/5 pyrethroid sprays), and despite higher 
expenditure on seed (as a result of the additional technology fee), they enjoyed 
a higher gross margin. However, it is important to stress that Bt does not kill 
all insects, and chemical spraying is still required to prevent damage by sucking 
insects, which in the past have been killed in the cross-fire aimed at bollworms. 
The Bt technology fee was adjusted downward by about 24 percent 
after the introduction season, following farmer concerns that the technol-
ogy was not affordable. The fee was then held constant at South African rand 
(ZAR) 600 per 25 kilograms of seed (between about $50 and $75 according 
to the fluctuating local currency)1 for 1999/2000–2002/03, at ZAR700 for 
2003/04–2004/05, and then at ZAR785 from 2005/06 to the 2008/09 season. 
Between 1999 and 2008 a 25 kilogram bag of conventional cotton sold for 
between ZAR150 and ZAR430. This means that the extra Bt technology fee 
per 25 kilogram bag was between 1.8 and 4.0 times the price of the bag of seeds 
(Gouse 2009).
Analysis of “who gains?” from Bt technology showed that despite the high 
technology fee, farmers captured the lion’s share of the additional benefits 
 1 All dollar amounts are US dollars.
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generated by the introduction of this new technology (Gouse, Pray, and 
Schimmelpfennig 2004). Basing their calculations on the abovementioned 
studies, Brookes and Barfoot (2010) estimated that in the 11 years from 
1998 to 2008, the use of Bt cotton contributed an additional $21 million to 
farm income in South Africa. 
The Makhathini Flats smallholder experience with Bt cotton has been 
hailed internationally as the first example of how modern biotechnology can 
benefit resource-poor farmers in Africa. There can be no doubt that the major-
ity of Makhathini Flats farmers did indeed benefit from the introduction of Bt 
cotton. They were able to adopt and benefit from this new technology because 
all the institutional structures that facilitate a functioning market were in place 
at the time. These structures include functioning input markets (credit, seeds, 
and chemicals) and output markets (seed cotton buyer) that operate at market 
clearing prices. An important factor was that Vunisa was the only buyer and, 
because of this monopsony power, could supply production credit to farmers 
who did not own their land, using the forthcoming crop as collateral (Gouse, 
Shankar, and Thirtle 2008). This system is not uncommon to Africa, where 
widespread failure of credit and input markets (partly due to lack of land 
ownership that could serve as collateral) has led to interlocked transactions, in 
which a firm wishing to purchase the farm output—typically a ginner in the 
case of cotton—provides inputs to farmers on credit and attempts to recover 
the credit upon purchase of the product (Tschirley, Poulton, and Boughton 
2006). However, when the credit system collapsed in 2002—because of farm-
ers defaulting on their loans as a consequence of a combination of droughts, 
low prices (linked to the low and stagnated world cotton price), marginal prof-
its, adverse selection, and market competition—the whole system collapsed, 
and cotton production dropped. 
The Makhathini smallholder experience is indeed a good example for 
the rest of Africa, as countries considering adoption of Bt cotton need to 
take note that although technical solutions can help address problems (such 
as lack of knowledge regarding insects and pest control, limited access to 
inputs, or evolution in pest pressure), no technology (GM or otherwise) can 
resolve the fundamental institutional challenges of smallholders and agri-
culture in Africa. The particular case of the Makhathini Flats and the wider 
story of cotton in South Africa emphasize that although all agricultural 
systems require adequate investment and appropriate technologies, their 
viability is determined by the policies and institutions that facilitate sustain-
able and profitable production. Bt cotton and more recently stacked (Bt/
HT) varieties are still the varieties of choice for smallholder producers, but 
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production levels have decreased drastically and remain limited mainly due 
to the relatively low price of cotton.
Bt Maize
Globally, in 2007 GM maize was planted on 35 million hectares, or 24 percent 
of world maize plantings, of which 9.3 million hectares was Bt as single trait 
and another 18.8 million hectares in combination with other traits ( James 
2007). In 2010 GM maize covered 46.8 million hectares globally, and the area 
increased to 51 million hectares in 2011 ( James 2010, 2011). Bt maize was 
first introduced in the United States in 1996, and by 2006 it covered 40 per-
cent or 12.7 million hectares of the total US maize crop. In Argentina, vari eties 
containing the Bt trait were planted on 73 percent of the total Argentinean 
maize area, and in Spain it covered 54,000 hectares or 15 percent of the total 
maize area (Brookes and Barfoot 2008).
Maize is the most important field crop in South Africa and annually cov-
ers an estimated 30 percent of the total arable land. Maize serves as staple 
food for the majority of the South African population and also as the main 
feedgrain for livestock. Between 60 and 70 percent of the South African yel-
low maize production is consumed in the chicken-production sector. Over the 
past 9–10 years, South Africa produced an average of 9.3 million metric tons 
of maize on 2.75 million hectares.
Even though Bt yellow maize was released in 1998 for commercial pro-
duction, GM white maize was commercialized only in 2001. That year, South 
Africa became the first country in the world to permit the commercial produc-
tion of a GM subsistence crop—Bt white maize. In South Africa and other 
southern African countries, the losses sustained in maize crops due to damage 
caused by the African maize stem (stalk) borer (Busseola fusca) are estimated to 
be between 5 and 75 percent, and it is generally accepted that, pre-Bt, Busseola 
annually reduced the South African maize crop by an average of 10 percent 
(Annecke and Moran 1982). Gouse et al. (2005) showed that in 2005 with 
a seemingly conservative estimate of 10 percent for damage caused by both 
Busseola fusca and Chilo partellus, the average annual loss (in the absence of 
Bt) adds up to just under a million tons of maize, with an approximate value 
of ZAR810 million. At the 2008 maize price level (more or less similar to the 
2011 price level), the potential damage caused by borers would be closer to 
ZAR1.6 billion (about $200 million). Both B. fusca and C. partellus can be 
controlled to a satisfactory level with the use of the Bt gene currently used in 
South African Bt varieties (Cry1Ac).
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As can be seen in Table 1.3, the initial spread of Bt maize was quite slow 
because of the scale-up time required to have a sufficient amount of seeds 
and to have the Bt trait inserted in hybrids that were suitably adapted to local 
conditions. Approval for commercial release of herbicide tolerance came in 
2002 and the stacked traits of Bt and HT in 2007. Compared to cotton, the 
decrease in Bt and HT maize since the introduction of stacked maize was less 
pronounced. Bt remains the most popular trait, partly because especially white 
stacked maize adoption has been hindered by inadequate seed availability. In 
the 2008/09 production season, GM maize covered 70 percent of the total 
South African maize area, with Bt maize covering 43 percent. In 2009/10 the 
Bt maize area increased by a further 269,000 hectares up to 48 percent, mainly 
stemming from a drop in the white stacked maize area because of inadequate 
seed supply.
Considering the adoption rates illustrated in Table 1.3, it is possible to con-
clude that South African maize farmers have benefited from the introduction 
of GM maize. Similar to the indicated GM cotton adoption rates in Table 1.1, 
these GM maize adoption rates represent adoption by predominantly com-
mercial farmers. There are no official smallholder GM maize adoption figures, 
but it is estimated that about 10,500 subsistence, smallholder, and emergent 
farmers (about 23 percent of the smaller farmers), buying hybrid seed from the 
three major seed companies, planted GM maize in 2007 (Gouse, Kirsten, and 
Van der Walt 2008). However, there are still areas in South Africa where small-
holders plant mainly open-pollinated varieties and traditional/saved seed, and 
definitions of subsistence, smallholder, smallholder projects, and emerging 
farmers also complicate estimations. It can therefore be argued that the num-
ber of smallholders planting GM maize is still relatively minimal.
Marra, Pardey, and Alston (2002) found that there were significant ben-
efits to planting Bt maize in the United States through increased yields, even 
when it appeared as if borer infestation levels were not large enough to con-
trol with insecticides. Marra, Carlson, and Hubbell (1998) reported that the 
use of Bt maize boosted yields by 4–8 percent, depending on location and 
year. Results from outside the United States show a similar pattern. In the 
Huesca region in Spain, Brookes (2002) reported a yield increase of 10 percent 
over conventional maize protected with pesticides and an increase of 15 per-
cent when insecticides were not used. Other regions in Spain enjoyed an aver-
age Bt yield advantage of 6.3 percent, with a range of 2.9–12.9 percent. James 
(2002) reported a 8–10 percent yield increase in Argentina up to 2004, and 
more recent studies show a 5–6 percent increase (Brookes and Barfoot 2008). 
Gonzales (2002) recorded a yield advantage of 41 percent for Bt maize on 
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field trials in the Philippines, and Philippine farmers indicated an even higher 
(60 percent) yield improvement. In most countries, the additional cost of the 
Bt technology has exceeded the savings on insecticides and thus has resulted in 
an increase in total production costs.
Compared to the number of studies and publications on Bt cotton in 
South Africa, the body of literature and the number of researchers follow-
ing the farm-level impacts of Bt maize in South Africa is rather limited. Even 
though there have been reports in the media quoting some anecdotal find-
ings of some fairly unscientific studies, only a series of studies by the University 
of Pretoria2 have endeavored to follow the socioeconomic effects and perfor-
mance of Bt maize for a number of seasons, mainly focusing on smallholders. 
Gouse et al. (2005) found average yield increases (due to better stem borer 
control) of 10–11 percent for commercial (dryland and irrigation) farmers, 
whereas smallholder Bt adopters reported yield increases of 0–32 percent for the 
seven seasons 2001/02–2007/08 (Gouse et al. 2010). A statistically insignificant 
average yield increase of 12 percent was found across the seven seasons. In sea-
sons with a low stem borer infestation, resulting in insignificant stalk borer dam-
age, farmers planting Bt maize seed were in all likelihood worse off than farmers 
planting conventional hybrid maize because of the extra Bt technology fee. It is 
however difficult to make preplanting predictions on seasonal stalk borer infes-
tation levels due to the complicated relationship between rainfall, variable sea-
sons, growth of maize, effect of stalk borer on the maize plant, and the effect of 
natural enemies on the host (Annecke and Moran 1982). Because a dry early sea-
son does not necessarily portend a dry season throughout, South African large-
scale commercial farmers indicate that Bt serves as affordable insurance against 
unforeseeable stalk borer outbreaks, but increases in seed cost or technology fees 
could easily outstrip that insurance value to small-scale and subsistence farmers 
in South Africa (Gouse et al. 2006). 
Gouse et al. (2006) endeavored to quantify the 16 percent yield increase, 
the average of the Bt yield advantage for two groups of farmers in north-
ern KwaZulu-Natal for the 2002/03 season, in subsistence-farmer terms. 
For these smallholders a 16 percent yield increase meant only 110 kilo-
grams of extra grain, and selling the extra grain would render a rather insig-
nificant income advantage. However, arguing that the extra grain replaces 
potentially purchased, relatively more expensive, maize meal (flour), the yield 
 2 Mainly supported by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Economic and Social Research Council/
Department for International Development funding and in collaboration with, among oth-
ers, Rutgers University, Imperial College, and the Programme on Mycotoxins and Experimental 
Carcinogenesis at the South African Medical Research Council.
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advantage seems more valuable. Alternatively, using a generally excepted rule-
of-thumb stating that a rural household of seven members requires fourteen 
80 kilogram bags of maize meal for a year to be food secure, the 16 percent 
yield advantage in 2002/03 resulted in approximately 36 more days of maize 
meal for the household. This is assuming, rather unrealistically, that there is no 
postharvest damage to harvested grain.
Insecticide use by maize-producing smallholders is limited, and Bt 
adoption consequently did not result in substantial insecticide savings. Bt 
adoption by commercial farmers has resulted in decreased expenditure on 
insecticides but, similar to what has been reported in other countries, generally 
not enough to cover the increased seed cost. Depending on the quantity 
of seed purchased, Bt maize seed was 23–25 percent more expensive than 
conventional seed, and more recently those percentages have increased to 
about 27–30 percent.
Following the planting of HT maize demonstration plots in 2003/04 and 
2004/05 in some smallholder areas where Bt had been introduced, a number 
of farmers adopted HT maize in 2005/06. Many farmers who planted Bt 
maize in previous years instead opted for HT seed (Gouse et al. 2010). 
Farmers indicated that compared to stem borers, weeds are a constant pest, 
and it would seem as if the labor-saving benefit of HT maize is valued higher 
than the insect control (yield) benefit of Bt. With a substantial share of the 
economically active, able-bodied population emigrating to urban areas in 
search of employment and a tragically high HIV/AIDS prevalence, especially 
in rural KwaZulu-Natal, labor has become a scarce commodity for many South 
African smallholder farmers. By using broad-spectrum herbicides before and 
after planting (some only after), as opposed to manual weeding with hand and 
hoe, farmers are able to save quite considerably on family labor person-days. 
For some of the seasons, HT maize also yielded more grain than conventional 
hybrid maize with manual weeding because of more effective weed control. 
In some areas in KwaZulu-Natal, HT has totally replaced Bt. In an attempt to 
benefit from both the GM technologies, some smallholders purchased stacked 
Bt/HT maize, but others indicated this maize is too expensive and opted for 
HT only (Gouse et al. 2010). Stem borer pressure has been low during the 
study seasons, and it would be interesting to see how HT-adopting farmers 
react to possible higher borer levels in seasons to come.
Using yield increase, insecticide savings, and increased seed expenditure 
indications of mainly Gouse et al. (2005), Brookes and Barfoot (2010) esti-
mated that between 2000 and 2008, Bt maize adoption increased adopt-
ing farmers’ farm income by a total of $476 million. That is a productivity 
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increase–induced injection into the economy of ZAR3.67 billion over 9 years. 
To put this amount into context, over the past 10 years the South African 
Government has, through the platforms and initiatives created under the 
National Biotechnology Strategy (Republic of South Africa, Department of 
Science and Technology 2001), invested about ZAR900 million (Hanekom 
2010) in biotechnology research and development.
Conclusion
Benefiting from a strong research background, South Africa was able to pro-
actively develop guidelines and later legislation and regulations on the devel-
opment and use of modern biotechnology and its applications such as GM 
crops. Development and implementation of a relatively dynamic GMO legisla-
tion and underlying regulations have enabled South African farmers—and, to 
a lesser extent, consumers, through maize meal prices and health aspects (see 
Chapter 2)—to benefit from the first wave of GM crops.
Solely based on the high adoption levels of especially Bt cotton and maize 
by large-scale farmers, in the presence of available and less-expensive conven-
tional seed varieties (including near isolines), it is possible to conclude that 
farmers benefited. Some peer-reviewed studies have shown that like large-
scale farmers, smallholder cotton and maize farmers have also benefited, 
mainly through savings on insecticide applications and limitation of the dam-
age caused by bollworms and stem borers. 
Whereas Bt cotton saw a near 100 percent smallholder adoption rate in only 
a couple of years, adoption of Bt maize has been limited. There are a number 
of reasons for this: in a vertically integrated production system where the input 
supplier also ensures an output market, adoption of a (early season) more expen-
sive but productivity-increasing technology makes sense. However, smallholder 
maize farmers have to fund production inputs, and as many only produce on a 
subsistence level (in many cases surplus production depends on the season’s rain-
fall), farmers are unable to directly recover their input expenditures. Contrary to 
cotton, for which bollworm pressure and damage seems to be more constant and 
severe, stem borer infestation levels (especially on dryland maize) vary signifi-
cantly from season to season and across areas, and the damage level is generally 
lower than with cotton. Though very few smallholder maize farmers apply an 
insecticide to control stem borers on maize, the amount of labor and chemicals 
required to control borers is far less than what is required to control bollworms 
on cotton. Another factor that is sometimes not taken into consideration, espe-
cially in the South African context, is that smallholder maize farmers’ reasons 
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or motivation for maize production differ. In the production of a cash crop like 
cotton, farmers are profit driven and are intent on producing as much as possi-
ble. On the contrary, some smallholder maize farmers are only interested in pro-
ducing enough for their households, others only plant a couple of lines for fresh 
maize, and yet others only produce to sell. It is unlikely that the smaller produc-
ers would invest in a productivity-increasing technology like Bt maize. 
That a technology was introduced and adopted and that farmers benefited 
does not necessarily result in a flourishing sector, as is evident from the exam-
ple of South African cotton. Even with biotechnology, South African cot-
ton farmers were not able to produce profitably at low cotton world prices. 
The fact that many smallholders continued producing, while commercial 
farmers left the sector for greener or more profitable pastures is indicative of 
smallholders’ dependence on government support and limited alternative pro-
duction options and not of the success of biotechnology. 
Bt seed technology is a production tool just like fertilizers, herbicides, or 
irrigation technologies. Contrary to the technologies of the Green Revolution, 
it might be able to improve the yields of farmers with limited ability or means 
to control insects. However, it will by no means be able to overcome institu-
tional failure and governance challenges that seem to be endemic in African 
agriculture and that were also the limiting factors in the Green Revolution. 
The experience with Bt cotton on the Makhathini Flats emphasizes that  
technology-induced advances might be short lived in the absence of the cor-
rect institutional structures, regulations, cooperation, and competition. 
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